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Abstract
Bush v. Gore was decided a year ago. As expected, it evoked a flood of
journalistic and academic commentary. The present authors write to
express dissatisfaction with the resulting literature. They find it in general
to be dominated by the usual political discourse conducted from opposite
ends of the usual political spectrum, with both ends sharing an assumption
that the Supreme Court was animated in its decision by the usual political
motives that it has become conventional to see in the actions of that
institution. Left almost completely out of view have been the more
personal selfish motives of the Justices that seem to the present authors to
be obvious, unusual, and paramount. Those motives and the reluctance of
others to comment on them are here taken to suggest that neither the Court
nor its supporters or critics are seriously concerned, as these authors are,
with the continuing decline of the right to self-government that is
dramatically marked by yet another decision by Justices who demean the
authority of elected officials.

Form of Publication
The authors have chosen this form of publication for two reasons. First,
they are mindful that they are late in entering a discussion and that those
aspects of the topic seeming to them to be of the greatest importance have
been largely neglected in that discussion. By publishing electronically,
their views can be presented a year earlier than they could be presented in
conventional print media. Second, the authors hope to evoke comments
from academic colleagues, lawyers and judges, and others interested in
reflecting on the Court’s disposition. Accordingly, anyone patient enough
to read this brief paper and react to it is assured that their comments will be
equally available to subsequent readers. This also permits us, if the
occasion arises, publicly to acknowledge the force of new information or
arguments that may be advanced by our readers. It is our hope that this
format, or enhancements of it, will prove to be useful to other authors of
other papers who seek to engage in public debate without the delays
attending traditional forms of publishing. Readers who wish to participate
in the discussion may visit http://www.law.duke.edu/pub/selfgov/.

No Copyright
This paper is dedicated to the public domain. If readers find it
useful to repeat any part of it, it would be a professional courtesy to cite the
present authors, but no property right is claimed.
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With reluctance, we add our
voices to the academic clamor over Bush
v. Gore.1
We do so because we are
distressed that so much of that clamor has
been predictable on the basis of the
political alignment of the authors, whether
they be among those dismissed by Chief
Judge Richard Posner as “liberals” who
want a Court to do their ideological
bidding2 or whether like the judge himself
they seem to be ideological allies of the
majority of the Court defending the
decision with reckless disregard for the
transparency of their arguments.
Critics and defenders of the Court
alike have supposed that the Justices were
motivated by conventional political
instincts, selecting a President whose
political ideology was closer to their own
and repaying political debts to those who
had conferred so much honor and power
on them by appointing them to the Court.
We do not share that suspicion. We have
confidence that all nine members of the
Court when deciding cases are able to lay
aside their ideological preferences among
candidates for public office and that none
would repay their private debts from
public stock.

1

There were really three cases that
are the object of attention: Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70
(Dec. 4, 2000) (vacating Florida Supreme
Court’s initial decision and remanding for
clarification); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046
(Dec. 9, 2000) (staying the recount ordered by
the Florida court); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(Dec. 12, 2000) (reversing the Florida court’s
recount decision).
2

BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE
2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COURT 150-189 (2001).

We perceive, however, that the
professional integrity of the Court was
subverted by a form of self-interest much
more powerful than mere ideology, one
seldom noted in the literature and one that
all the Justices should have recognized as
disqualifying them from sitting on such a
case. That interest is their own personal
status and power.
Each Justice has a direct personal
interest in the identity of the person who
will appoint his or her colleagues.
Particularly for members of a Court as
evenly and constantly divided as the
Rehnquist Court, a single unwelcome
appointment would demote the five in the
majority from the power to decide the
Court’s important cases to the impotence
of dissent. Nothing save death or serious
illness could be a more distressing
prospect to a Justice sitting in the majority
of such a Court. In like manner, a single
welcome appointment would promote the
four in the minority from a position of
perpetual impotence to a position of
gratifying power. Nothing, not even a
large cash bequest, could be a more
welcome prospect to a Justice sitting as a
member of a frustrated minority. If there
were ever a case in which the Court
should have refused to exercise
jurisdiction, Bush v. Gore would seem to
us to be it. That they did decide it should
have occasioned their denunciation on all
sides, but there have been only a few
polite murmers about this aspect of the
case.
That all the Justices were
disqualified from sitting on the case is,
however, only one element of our protest.
The additional point we wish to make is
that not only the self-aggrandizing
decision in Bush v. Gore, but much of the
commentary by both friends and foes
expresses or at least reflects a chronic and
growing disrespect for the institutions of
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self-government.
The ends of the
political spectrum appear to us to be
united in their unseemly enthusiasm for
what has become known as the Court’s
counter-majoritarianism.
We would like to be reassured
that members of the Court and of its
academic audience can recall the prose of
Jefferson in the Declaration.3 Or of the
Framers in the Preamble.4 Or of Lincoln
at Gettysburg.5 Or that any have read
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and considered its possible
application to citizens of the United
States.6 It seems to us that the Court has
for some time lost touch (if it was ever
really in touch) with its responsibility for
the
nurture
and
protection
of
representative government and has
acquired the habit of deciding just about
any interesting question that comes its
way with little or no regard for the
preferences of those who were elected to
decide them. It thus appears to us to
present inadequate respect for the other
branches of the federal government, or for
the institutions of state and local
government. Bush v. Gore should be

3

. . . That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their power from the consent of the
governed.
4

We the People of the United States
. . . do ordain and establish this Constitution.
5

. . . We resolve . . . that government
of the people, by the people, and for the
people shall not perish from the earth.
6

. . . The will of the people shall be
the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

3

taken, as it has not been, to dispel the
illusion that the judiciary is “the least
dangerous branch.”
Believing as we do in the wisdom
of the rhetoric noted and in the right of
citizens to govern through elected
representatives, we hold that the
ubiquitous and most important duty of the
Supreme Court of the United States is to
mind its own business and respect the
roles of other institutions of government.
Its complete failure to perform that duty
in Bush v. Gore is the cause of our
disappointment. It also disappoints but
does not surprise us that Judge Posner, the
author of a book about the importance of
Overcoming Law in order to reach
gratifying results, should see nothing
terribly wrong about the Court’s disregard
of controlling legal texts and traditions to
spare the nation a period of uncertainty
about the outcome of the election. With
regret, we take his point that many of the
Court’s critics have long espoused an
expanded political role for the Court to
which the decision in Bush v. Gore can be
seen as a suitable response. We cannot
deny that the admirers of Justice William
Brennan on and off the Court have indeed
“overcome law” in the belief that the
Justices could and should make up for any
shortfall in the humanitarian impulses of
other “majoritarian” branches and
elements of American government, a
competence that we and some others
deny.
By “overcoming law” with
impugnity, they have contributed mightily
to the sad state of representative
government in America.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist
in the days when he was a fulminating
dissenter to the Brennan Court cautioned
his brethren against the ubiquitous
temptation to exceed their authority by
quoting John Stuart Mill:

4
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The disposition of mankind,
whether as rulers or fellow citizens,
to impose their own opinions and
inclinations as a rule of conduct for
others, is so energetically supported
by some of the best and some of the
worst feelings incident to human
nature, that is hardly ever kept
under constraint by anything but
want of power.7
Alas that the Chief Justice was unable to
restrain himself in Bush v. Gore. No
doubt he rationalized his decision as a
manifestation of his better “feelings,” but
that should not conceal the nature of his
act from others who understand political
power and its malign effects on those who
possess it, whatever their political
persuasion.
Our keenest disappointment,
however, is with the performance of
Justice Antonin Scalia, who has long and
ardently presented himself as an advocate
of the self-restraint required by judges
participating in a republican form of
government. We therefore first review
his utterances of principles with many of
which we are in agreement. We will then
measure his performance in Bush v. Gore
against the standards he has proclaimed
for himself and others, taking separately
his votes for the per curiam opinion of the
Court, the concurrence in which he
joined, and the order staying further
counting of the votes.

JUSTICE SCALIA ON THE RIGHT TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT
“I take the need for theoretical
legitimacy seriously,” Scalia wrote in a
1989 article, and he has repeatedly (and
correctly in our view) linked the issue of
judicial legitimacy with his understanding
of “the nature and purpose of a
Constitution in a democratic system.”8
“The courts of the United States derive all
their power from an instrument (the
United States Constitution) which begins:
‘We, the people of the United States . . .’
It is quite impossible for the courts,
creatures and agents of the people of the
United States, to impose upon those
people of the United States norms that
those people themselves (through their
democratic
institutions)
have
not
accepted.”9 The fundamental principle of
American constitutionalism according to
Justice Scalia is “the eminently
democratic principle that --except where
constitutional imperatives intervene— the
majority rules.”10
For Justice Scalia the overriding
desideratum of a theory of constitutional
interpretation was said to be to enable
courts to carry out their limited function
of safeguarding justiciable constitutional
imperatives while ensuring that judges do
not trespass on the broad grounds of
legitimate democratic decision-making by
substituting their own policy preferences

8

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989).
9

Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1119 (1996).
7

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
467 (1971) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quoting
Mill, On Liberty 28 (1885).

10

California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
for the Court).
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for those of political actors. This is no
easy task, Scalia admits: “Now the main
danger in judicial interpretation of the
Constitution--or, for that matter, in
judicial interpretation of any law--is that
the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law. Avoiding this
error is the hardest part of being a
conscientious
judge;
perhaps
no
conscientious judge ever succeeds
entirely.”11 It is fair to assume, we
believe, that Scalia’s frequent statements
of interpretive principle reflect his belief
that both he and his colleagues are at risk
of committing this anti-democratic error
and are less likely to succumb to
temptation the more clearly they keep
before them the proper approach to
interpretation.
Justice Scalia has identified two
general principles of constitutional
interpretation that, taken together, he
believes capable of guiding judicial
review in a manner respectful of
democratic prerogatives. The first of
these is adherence to the plain meaning of
a controlling text.12
But of course meaning is often
less than plain. Where the text is cast in
terms of great generality, this invites even
a judge wishing to be conscientious about
respecting democracy to read into the
provision “notions of fairness or textual
fidelity”13 that were not in fact endorsed
by the democratic processes conferring
legitimacy on the text. The Due Process

11

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 863.
12

13

Id.

Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards
of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 581, 589 (1990).
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and Equal Protection Clauses are obvious
examples of such provisions.
When enforcing those provisions,
Justice Scalia asserts that the Court cannot
identify and protect against the political
process an individual right that “is not to
be found in the longstanding traditions of
our society, [or] logically deduced from
the text of the Constitution.”14 The Court
must then, he tells us, give determinative
weight in such cases to what he often calls
tradition. “The distinction between what
is needed to support novel procedures and
what is needed to sustain traditional ones
is fundamental;” a practice that “is one of
the continuing traditions of our legal
system ... define[s]” what due process and
equal protection meant and, thus, mean.15
Challenges to traditional practices are to
be answered “on the basis of the ‘timedated’ meaning of equal protection in
1868;” adherence to practices that were
accepted at the time the amendment was
adopted “does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, because that is not what
‘equal protection of the laws’ ever
meant.”16 The “‘time-dated’” historical
14

Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15

Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion of
SCALIA, J.). Burnham was a due process case.
Justice Scalia has endorsed the same approach
to equal protection issues. In addition to the
quotation in the text, see, e.g., J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156-163
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568-69 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)
16

Scalia, Response, in ANTONIN
SCALIA
ET
AL.,
A
MATTER
OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 148-49 (1997). Justice Scalia’s remarks
were an amplification of his earlier assertion
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meaning of the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses thus takes priority over
the meaning that a Justice might ascribe
to the text in the abstract on the basis of
his or her “notions of fairness or textual
fidelity.”

readers who think they can reconcile his
self-serving votes with his previous
rhetoric regarding the proper role of the
Court as one feature of a democratic
government.

The Scalia votes in Bush v. Gore
were dramatic departures from these
principles. The plain meaning of the
constitutional text of Article II and the
“time-dated” meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause both pointed, beyond
question it seemed to us, in the direction
opposite to that taken by him. We would
especially welcome enlightenment from

THE PER CURIAM OPINION OF THE
COURT: “TIME-DATED” MEANING

that what constitutes a denial of equal
protection on the basis of sex is fixed by the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment “when
it was adopted.” See Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System, in id. at 47.
(Scalia was responding to Professor Ronald
Dworkin’s criticism that Scalia’s “time-dated”
interpretation of the equal protection clause
“reads into that language limitations that the
language ... cannot bear.”
Dworkin,
Comment, in id. at 126.) Scalia responded
that Dworkin “quite entirely mistakes my
position. ... Denial of equal protection on
[various grounds including sex] is prohibited –
but that still leaves open the question of what
constitutes a denial of equal protection.”
Is it a denial of equal protection on the
basis of sex to have segregated toilets
in public buildings, or to exclude
women from combat? I have no idea
how Professor Dworkin goes about
answering such a question. I answer it
on the basis of the “time-dated”
meaning of equal protection in 1868.
Unisex toilets and women assault
troops may be ideas whose time has
come, and the people are certainly free
to require them by legislation; but
refusing to do so does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, because that
is not what “equal protection of the
laws” ever meant.

We consider first his vote in
support of the per curiam opinion of the
Court. Justice Scalia was one of seven
Justices holding that the decision of the
Florida Supreme Court calling for a hand
recount of the undervote was a denial of
Equal Protection of the Law because that
court failed to specify detailed standards
as to how that recount was to be
conducted, thus leaving open the
possibility that between two identical
ballots one might be counted and the
other not because those doing the
recounting were applying different
standards.
Unaccountably to us, none of the
parties or amici in Bush v. Gore briefed
the
question
of
the
historical
understanding of ballot counting and
Equal Protection in 1868, although Vice
President Gore’s lawyers did note,
correctly, that the Florida court’s general
“intent of the voter” standard, which the
state court drew from the Florida election
code,17 was well within the mainstream of
current and longstanding practice in many
states.18 This failure of proof ought itself

17

“No vote shall be declared invalid
or void if there is a clear indication of the
intent of the voter as determined by the
canvassing board.” Fla. St. § 101.5614, cited
in Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262.
18

See Brief for Respondent Albert
Gore, Jr., Bush v. Gore, at 44-46.
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to have made it problematic at best for
Justice Scalia to join an opinion resting on
the Equal Protection argument. In other
contexts involving broadly
stated
individual rights provisions he has made it
clear that the burden of persuasion rests
on the party seeking to read into the
provision a specific limitation. “For if the
Constitution does not affirmatively
contain such a restriction, the matter . . . is
left to state constitutions or to the
democratic process.”19 State action – at
19

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 976 n.6 (1991) (Scalia, J., for the Court).
The specific context was a disagreement
between the majority and Justice White in
dissent whether the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment
imposes
a
general
requirement
of
proportionality
between
crime
and
punishment. White argued that the clause
does, in part because he found no evidence of
“an [original] intention to exclude [such a
requirement] from the reach of the words that
otherwise could reasonably be construed to
include it.” Id. at 1011 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia replied that White’s argument
“[s]urely [was] an extraordinary method for
determining what restrictions upon democratic
self-government the Constitution contains.”
It seems to us that our task is not
merely to identify various meanings
that the text “could reasonably” bear,
and then impose the one that from a
policy standpoint pleases us best.
Rather, we are to strive as best we can
to select from among the various
“reasonable” possibilities the most
plausible meaning. We do not bear the
burden of “proving an affirmative
decision against the proportionality
component,” ibid.; rather, Justice
WHITE bears the burden of proving an
affirmative decision in its favor. For if
the Constitution does not affirmatively
contain such a restriction, the matter of
proportionality is left to state
constitutions or to the democratic
process.

7

least state action that is not (in Justice
Scalia’s view) a per se violation of the
Constitution20 – supposedly enjoys for
Scalia a genuine presumption of
constitutionality, a presumption that he
did not apply in Bush v. Gore.
Our disappointment in Justice
Scalia’s decision to join the per curiam
opinion deepens when we turn from
presumptions
regarding
traditional
practice to substance. Even without the
assistance of counsel, Scalia or his clerks
could easily have discovered (as one of us
Id. at 976 n.6. See also City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (meaning of free exercise clause);
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept.
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (meaning of due process clause).
We are aware of nothing written by Justice
Scalia suggesting that he would endorse a
different approach to the equal protection
clause.
20

Justice Scalia’s position on racebased affirmative action is presumably an
example of a per se violation of the text of the
equal protection clause, since his views are
inconsistent with, among other matters, the
apparent original understanding of the clause.
Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) with
Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE
L.J. 427, 427 (1997) (“Congress in the 1860s
repeatedly enacted statutes allocating special
benefits to blacks on the express basis of race
(and I am not referring to the well-known
Freedmen's Bureau Acts, which did not rely
on express racial classifications). Accordingly,
to be true to their principles, two of the five
Justices in the prevailing anti-affirmative
action majority-- Justices Scalia and Thomas,
whose commitment to original understandings
and practices is also a matter of
record--should
drop
their
categorical
opposition to race-based affirmative action
measures.”).

8
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did in a few hours in the library) that the
practice of permitting after-the-fact
evaluation of ballots on a highly general
intent of the voter standard, a practice
constitutionally indistinguishable from the
standard set forth by the Florida court,
was extremely widespread in the period
leading up to 1868, and indeed apparently
unchallenged.
The earliest important case that
Justice Scalia might have regarded as the
foundation of a tradition was decided in
New York in 1827, People ex rel. Yates v.
Ferguson.21 The question in Ferguson
was whether ballots identifying “H.F.
Yates” as the candidate chosen should be
counted as votes for a candidate named
Henry F. Yates. In concluding that they
could be so counted, the court noted that
it was the practice of New York’s state
elections board to count abbreviated
names as valid votes for a candidate,
despite the existence of a statute requiring
a lawful ballot to contain the candidate’s
name, when “the canvassers adjudge that
the abbreviation represents the word,
which word represents the name of the
person voted for,” and that this practice
was justifiable only because “the
abbreviation is evidence of the intent of
the voter.”
A fortiori, the court
concluded, a jury hearing a case involving
ambiguous ballots was entitled to consult
whatever
“testimony,
facts
and
circumstances,” including the testimony
of the voter himself, that would bear on
the question for whom the voter intended
to vote.22
The Ferguson court’s holding that
personal testimony was admissible to
assist a jury in allocating an ambiguous

21

8 COW. 102 (N.Y. Supr. 1827).

22

Id. at 107.

ballot proved controversial. Several other
states rejected that specific element of
Ferguson.23 In other respects, however,
Ferguson was entirely typical of the
decisions we have found from the four
decades that separated Ferguson from the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The reported cases from that period seem,
almost invariably, to expect elections
boards to apply a non-formalistic and
quite general standard in deciding how to
count ambiguous ballots.24 The case that
seems to have gone the furthest in
imposing a judicially crafted rule on the
discretion of local elections officials was
People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott,25 a case

23

See, e.g., People ex rel. AttorneyGeneral v. Tisdale, 1 DOUG. 59, 63-64 (Mich.
1843); Attorney General ex rel. Carpenter v.
Ely, 4 Wis. 438, 449 (1854). (The New York
Court of Appeals itself later rejected the
practice of permitting voters to testify as to
their intentions. See People v. Saxton, 22
N.Y. 309, 311 (1860) (“The intention of the
voter is to be inferred ... by a reasonable
construction of his acts.”)
24

See, e.g., Ferguson, 8 COW. at 106
(without “confin[ing] themselves to names
written or printed at full length ... [t]he intent
of the voter is to be ascertained by the
canvassers”); Tisdale, 1 DOUG. at 65
(canvassers “were to ascertain that intention
from the votes,” not permitting “a slight error”
to “prevent the vote from being counted for
the person for whom it was evidently
intended”); Ely, 4 Wis. at 449 (voter’s intent
may be “explained by the surrounding
circumstances, from facts of a general public
nature, connected with the election, and the
different candidates, which may aid you in
coming to the right conclusion”); State ex rel.
Spaulding v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 551 (1860);
Day v. Kent, 1 Or. 123 (Oreg. Terr. 1854);
People ex rel. Akin v. Matteson, 7 Peck 167
(Ill. 1855).
25

16 Mich. 283 (1868).
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decided in Michigan in 1868, but even
there the court acknowledged that
canvassing officials should count
imperfectly executed ballots where the
ballot’s appearance was “sufficient to
show an intent to vote against the one
[candidate] and for the other.”26
While it is clear that pre-1868
judges were well aware of the danger that
the officials responsible for counting
ballots could err, by mistake or
otherwise,27 we have found little
suggesting that the courts of that era
thought that the establishment of specific
standards or uniform rules was necessary
or even desirable in order to prevent such
error. As far as any court might go was to
ban the use by elections officials of
“extrinsic evidence,” by which was meant
the consideration of other information
besides that evident on the face of the
ballots, interpreted in light of “such
matters of public notoriety, as that certain
well-known abbreviations are generally
used to designate particular names, and
the like.”28 In disputed elections that
26

Id. at 307. (opinion of Campbell,
J.) (requiring elections officials to disallow
ballots giving the candidate’s initials rather
than his given names in full on the authority
of Tisdale). See also id. at 310 (opinion of
Christiancy, J.) (concurring on the authority of
Tisdale while questioning the rule “on
principle”); id. at 317 (Cooley, C.J., dissenting
in part) (regretting the court’s adherence to
Tisdale “notwithstanding the majority are of
opinion that it is unsound in principle”).
27

See People ex rel. Hodgkinson v.
Stevens, 5 Hill. 616, 626 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1843)
(opinion of Nelson, C.J.) (“it is the duty of
courts to restrain the doings of canvassers of
elections strictly within the limits of the
authority under which they act”).
28

(1853).

People v. Cook, 4 N.Y. 67, 81

9

came before the courts, there was
disagreement over the extent to which
extrinsic evidence was admissible.29
There, too, however, we have found little
indication that any court believed it
necessary to establish affirmative and
specific guidelines to govern a jury’s
judgment as to voter intention.
The controlling goal, virtually
every reported case agreed, was to
determine correctly “the simple fact of the
intention of the voters who cast their
votes,”30, and as a general matter a voter’s
failure to follow with precision statutory
or customary rules about the form of his
ballots was not permitted to defeat that
intention where it could be discerned.31
At the polls’ closing, as one court put it
[t]he choice of the voters has
become a perfect fixed fact. To
make proof of that fact is all that
remains to be done. Counting the
votes and making the returns are
not part of the election, but the
mere steps of the agents of those
who have voted, to make known
the result. Now, it must be evident

29

Compare Ely, 4 Wis. at 449-50
(facts “connected with the election”
admissible “for the purpose of aiding the jury
in determining who was intended to be voted
for”) with People ex rel. Lake, 3 Mich. 233,
235 (1854) (such evidence properly excluded).
30

31

Matteson, 7 Peck at 169

See, e.g., id. (“When we are
satisfied on that point [sc. the voter’s intent],
we are bound to give effect to such
intention.”); Saxton, 22 N.Y. at 311 (voter’s
intent to vote for candidate by writing in his
name to be effectuated despite failure to strike
out name of other candidate on printed ballot);
State ex rel Philips v. Goldthwaite, 16 Wis.
146 (1862).

10
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that it is quite immaterial to the
electors and the elected, whose
rights are involved in the
transaction, in what way the choice
of the people is discovered, if the
means used suffice to carry that
choice into effect. . . . Truth, if
recognized, is not to be rejected
because it comes through an
imperfect channel.32
Indeed, the most respected
constitutionalist of the time, Thomas
Cooley, addressed this issue only months
before the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment was proclaimed. “The true
rule upon this subject” is that “where the
intent of the voter as expressed by his
ballot, when considered in the light of
such surrounding circumstances, is not
doubtful, the ballot should be counted and
allowed for the person intended.”33 In the
case before him, the Michigan Supreme
Court divided over whether canvassing
officials could accept ballots that gave the
initials rather than the full given name(s)
of a candidate, with a majority believing
itself bound by authority to require the
rejection of such ballots. As Chief Justice
Cooley noted, however, the court left
unquestioned as a general matter the
power of local elections officials to count
ballots where “the error of the voter is not
so great, when the facts surrounding the
election are considered, as to leave his
intent in no real doubt.” Cooley’s views
were no aberration. In the light of this
fact, the Court had no basis whatever -- if
the original, “time-dated” meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to govern -- for
condemning as unconstitutional the
Florida Supreme Court’s adoption a

32

33

Day, 1 Or. at 128.

People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott,
16 Mich. at 319-20 (1868).

practice that was traditional at the time
the amendment became part of the
Constitution.34
Perhaps there is some other way
to read the 19th century cases than the one
we have presented; possibly there are
other cases or sources that could lead
someone to a different conclusion than
that expressed by Chief Justice Cooley.
Justice Scalia, however, did not make
such an argument. In joining the per
curiam opinion he simply ignored the
very materials, the very question, that he
has repeatedly defined as determinative
for his own views on constitutional issues.

34

Two additional issues merit brief
attention. (1) Although most of the cases we
have found do not deal with multi-district
elections of the sort before the Court today,
those that do give no indication that the courts
deciding them perceived the difference to be
significant with respect to dealing with
ambiguous ballots. See, e.g., People ex rel.
Hodgkinson, 5 Hill 616 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1843);
People ex rel. Lake, 3 Mich. 233 (1854). (2)
We have been able to discover no case dealing
with a presidential election. But see Ex parte
Heath, 3 Hill 42 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1842) (stating
in dicta that the principle of election law being
applied “is the same, whether considered in
reference to elections in municipal
corporations, to county, district or state
elections, or even a federal election for
president”). But there obviously is nothing
whatever in the text of the equal protection
clause or, for that matter, our precedents, that
justifies treating a state’s duty to afford voters
equal protection as any different when the
election is for presidential electors than when
it is for any other officials. The distinction
that the Supreme Court has drawn in the one
person/one vote cases between congressional
and state-legislative districting rests on the
fact that congressional districting is controlled
not by the equal protection clause but by
Article I. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783,
792-93 (1973).
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Judge Posner who disapproved
the Equal Protection analysis tendered in
the per curiam opinion has advanced a
pragmatic justification for the decision by
Justice Scalia and the other two
concurring Justices to join the per curiam
opinion despite its transparent weakness
and despite its inconsistency with the
majority’s decision to stop the recount
altogether.35
But in his view, the
concurring Justices “had no real choice:”

This argument – that a justice properly
may endorse a conclusion that he deems
contrary to law in order to avoid (or
reduce) unfavorable commentary on his
“brethren”– may be sensible for someone
like Chief Judge Posner who takes what
he calls “a pragmatic approach to
adjudication,” although it is important to
note that what Posner is commending as
“a bit of Realpolitik” is a deliberate
refusal to obey the law or to be candid.37

Had they not joined the equal
protection ground, the outcome of
the case would have been no
different – a reversal terminating
the recount – but there would have
been a majority to reject both
possible grounds for the reversal,
the equal protection ground (which
by hypothesis the three concurring
Justices plus Stevens and Ginsburg
would have voted against) and the
Article II ground (which all but the
three concurring Justices would
have refused – in fact did refuse –
to join). What a field day the
critics of Bush v. Gore would then
have had!36

For us, concern for the Court’s
reputation as a court of law pointed in the
contrary direction of a refusal to hear the
case. By deciding it on the merits, the
Court passed up an extraordinary
opportunity to instruct the American
people on the Court’s limited role in the
constitutional scheme and the related
responsibility of citizens to resolve such
issues by democratic means.38 Such a
decision would have created “a field day”
for members of the profession seeking to
persuade the people that the Court is
indeed an institution of law and not
merely, as many must always suspect, a
mechanism for indulging the preferences
of nine powerful individuals.

In short, and on the assumption
(which Posner does not examine) that the
concurring Justices did not actually think
the
Equal
Protection
argument
convincing, they nonetheless were
justified in joining the per curiam opinion
in order to reduce the Court’s (which is to
say their own) vulnerability to criticism.

37

POSNER, BREAKING THE
DEADLOCK 169. The quotations are from a
sarcastic criticism of Justice Breyer for not
engaging in such Realpolitik.
38

35

Id. at 128. See also id. at 152 (“If
the vice of the Florida supreme court’s
decision ... was the standardless character of
the recount that it ordered, the logical remedy
was to direct that court to adopt standards [or]
dismiss the suit.”).
36

Id. at 168.

It would have been just the right
occasion to quote James Bradley Thayer’s
very wise advice on the need to remind the
people “of the great range of possible mischief
that our system leaves open, and must leave
open,” because [u]nder no system can the
power of courts go far to save a people from
ruin.” The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 156 (1893).
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Justice Scalia, we are pleased to
affirm is not a Posnerian pragmatist,39 nor
one prone to govern his actions by
considerations of public relations.
Consistency in the application of an
appropriate constitutional methodology
may be of little importance to Posner, but
it is crucial to Justice Scalia’s own
conception of the proper judicial role.
The very purpose of his “interpretive
philosophy” lies “in the rejection of
usurpatious
new”
principles
of
constitutional law. “My fidelity to the
methodology should be judged ... by cases
discovering a novel constitutional right.”40
That is, of course, precisely what the per
curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore did -“discover a novel constitutional right” to
create a “usurpatious new” principle. The
fact that there may have been a different
argument for reaching the same result in
that particular case that was perhaps less
vulnerable does not explain how a Justice
committed to consistency as a primary
judicial virtue could join in announcing
such a novel and therefore illegitimate
right. As Justice Scalia wrote in United
States v. Virginia:
Besides its centrality to the rule of
law in general, consistency has a

special role to play in judge-made
law - both judge-pronounced
common
law
and
judgepronounced determinations of the
application of statutory and
constitutional provisions. Legislatures are subject to democratic
checks upon their lawmaking.
Judges less so, and federal judges
not at all. The only checks on the
arbitrariness of federal judges are
the insistence upon consistency and
the application of the teachings of
the mother of consistency, logic.41
The Supreme Court of the United
States does not sit to announce
“unique” dispositions. Its principal
function
is
to
establish
precedent--that is, to set forth
principles of law that every court in
America must follow. As we said
only this Term, we expect both
ourselves and lower courts to
adhere to the “rationale upon which
the Court based the results of its
earlier decisions.” ... That is the
principal reason we publish our
opinions.42
THE CONCURRING OPINION: THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE II

39

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique
of History in Adjudication and Legal
Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 595-96
(2000): “The originalists of the present day,
such as Justice Scalia, are reacting to the
exercise of free-wheeling judicial discretion
by the courts during the era of Earl Warren
and, to only a slightly lesser extent, of his
successor, Warren Burger. The originalists
want to minimize judicial discretion and they
have devised a kind of algorithmic mechanism
for doing so.”
40

Scalia, Response, in A MATTER

OF INTERPRETATION 139.

Not only did Justice Scalia join in
the per curiam opinion refusing to
consider the “time-dated” meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause, but he also
signed a concurring opinion of Chief

41

Scalia, Assorted Canards, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. at 588.
42

518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting), quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996)
(emphasis added).
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Justice Rehnquist that seems to us
(notwithstanding Judge Posner’s defense
of it) to flout the plain meaning of Article
II of the Constitution. That opinion
proposed an alternative basis for the
Court’s decision. Article II, § 1, cl. 2, of
the Constitution provides that “[e]ach
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct,” its
presidential electors. The concurrence
reasoned that the Florida court’s order of
a recount of the undervote was so
substantial a “depart[ure] from the
legislative scheme” that it unconstitutionally encroached on Article II’s
delegation of power to the Florida
legislature to direct the manner in which
presidential electors are to be appointed.43
The concurring Justices therefore
concluded that “[f]or these reasons, in
addition to those given in the per curiam,”
the Florida court order ought to be
reversed.44
Indeed, it could scarcely be more
plain that the authors and ratifiers of
Article Two regarded the selection of the
state’s presidential electors to be in the
first instance a task for the Florida
legislature, but how the legislators chose
to do this was their business. They might,
as far as the federal Constitution is
concerned, have chosen to count no votes
but their own as the elected representatives of the people of Florida and
have chosen electors according to their
own preferences. Of course, no state
legislature has chosen this course for
many years, presumably because the
people of the state would promptly throw
all the rascals out. Like all other states,
43

531 U.S. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J.,

concurring).
44

concurring).

Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
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therefore, Florida has chosen to engage
the services of citizen voters, local
governments, and the courts of the state
for specific and varying roles in the
selection of presidential electors. Each of
these bodies and institutions has a limited
role and in the end the designation of
presidential electors remains, as the
Constitution
provides,
with
the
legislature.
After ratification of the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, Florida
could not discriminate among voters on
the basis of their race or gender, but these
are the only textual provisions in the
Constitution of the United States bearing
on the states’ authority to choose their
electors in a manner agreeable to its own
elected representatives.
If, as Judge
Posner and other defenders of the
majority contend, the decision of the
Supreme Court of Florida was lawless,
the legislature remained free, insofar as
federal law is concerned, to disregard that
decision and certify presidential electors
according to its own best judgment. If the
legislature was inhibited in following that
course, the inhibitions came from the text
of the Florida constitution and the fear of
an adverse response of the people to a
decision that they might have deemed
illegitimate.
Article II of the Constitution of
the United States provides that the vote of
each state’s electors is reported to the
President of the United States Senate, and
the votes are tabulated in a joint session of
Congress.
The final authority for
resolving a contested presidential election
resides in the elected members of the
United States House of Representatives.
Just as it is plain that the primary
responsibility rests with the Florida
legislature, it is equally plain that the
architects of the Constitution went to
some trouble to avoid any invitation to the
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life-tenured Justices to participate in the
selection of the President.
The
connecting thread in the constitutional
system the Founders devised for choosing
the President is that the bodies
constitutionally entrusted with responsibility are, in each instance, accountable
to the people and can be dismissed from
office if the commit the sin of selfdealing. If it were a good idea to involve
the life-tenured Justices in picking the
President who picks them, James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and their
colleagues would have been smart enough
to arrange that.
There was, however, as we have
noted, a compelling reason not to give
Justices a role in Presidential elections.
Of all the public officials in the United
States other than the candidates
themselves, those having the greatest
personal stake in the outcome of a
presidential election are the Justices of the
Supreme Court. The point is so obvious
that it needed no discussion at
Philadelphia, or in the Federalist Papers,
or elsewhere when the Constitution was
being debated. Nor, it seemed to us,
should it have been necessary to call this
to the attention of a professed textualist
such as Justice Scalia.45 Yet the point has
45

When the argument was made to
the Court a few years ago that it could review
the procedures by which the Senate tries
judges who have been impeached, the Court
dismissed the argument as “counterintuitive”
because it would “place final reviewing
authority with respect to impeachments in the
hands of the same body that the impeachment
process is meant to regulate.” Bush v. Gore
reached a conclusion equally at odds with
“with the Framers’ insistence that our system
be one of checks and balances” on the
judiciary as well as on the political branches.
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234-35
(1993).

received very little attention in the
literature about the case.
THE STAY ORDER
Justice Scalia made a brief
attempt to defend the Court’s December 9
order temporarily staying the Florida
recount three days before it decided that
the count should be permanently stayed.
He wrote that the stay was proper because
“[c]ount first, and rule upon legality
afterwards, is not a recipe for producing
election results that have the public
acceptance democratic stability requires.”46 This sentence is both puzzling
(counting the votes first and ruling upon
the legal issues afterwards is the ordinary
course of election-related litigation) and
unintentionally revealing. It is not in fact
the task of the courts or the litigation
process to “produce” election results or,
for that matter, democratic stability in any
direct sense. The stability of democratic
government depends primarily on
democratic politics that assure citizens of
the right and power to choose those
making important public decisions and to
discard self-aggrandizing public officers.
Of the decisions made by the
Court in Bush v. Gore, the stay order is
the least defensible. Even if there were
substance to either of the constitutional
arguments advanced in the per curiam and
in the concurring opinions, there is no
justification for the stay order except the
realpolitik argument advanced by Judge
Posner. Self-serving realpolitik is the
only possible explanation of the Scalia
utterance with regard to the stay. If
indeed, the Florida court must supply
detailed standards, it was for it to decide
whether there was time to do so. If
46

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046,
1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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indeed, the issue is for the legislature
under Article II, neither is that a reason
for those with life tenure to stop the
count.
WHAT REMAINS OF
SELF-GOVERNMENT?
The fundamental point we wish to
make regarding Justice Scalia’s behavior
in Bush v. Gore has little to do with his
(or any other Justice’s) personal failings
or lapses in consistency. Our reason for
directing attention to his votes is that he
was the Justice most likely to take
seriously the duty to obey legal texts in an
important case involving the power and
self-interest of the Justices themselves,
and thereby most likely to respect the
institutions of self-government.
His
disregard of that duty reveals the Court as
an arrogant band of men and women
having scant respect for representative
government.
In the situation before the Court,
the Constitution on its face provided for a
political means of resolving the Florida
vote controversy and, thus, the
presidential election. If the recount had
continued under the Florida court’s
December 8 order, the ballots would have
been recounted as ballots have
traditionally been counted in this country,
by hand and on a local basis by officials
having no direct personal stake in the
outcome, and under a standard that is both
traditional and the one ordained by the
Florida legislature. It was that legislature,
after all, and not the state supreme court,
which created the rule that “[n]o vote
shall be declared invalid or void if there is
a clear indication of the intent of the voter
as determined by the canvassing board.”47

47

Fla. St. § 101.5614.
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Furthermore, accepting for the sake of
argument the concurrence’s insistence
that Article II vests the state legislature
with the sole and curiously undelegable
power to determine how a state’s electors
are to be appointed, there is – as noted -no reason to doubt that the Florida
legislature retained the power to select a
slate of electors whatever the result of a
recount – and indeed the legislature was
on the verge of doing so when the
Supreme Court relieved it of further
responsibility.
In any event, and regardless of
what came out of Florida, under Article II
and the Twelfth Amendment, the joint
session of both houses of Congress in the
first instance, and the House of
Representatives in the event the electoral
vote count in the joint session did not
produce an electoral college victor, had
the textually committed power to
determine who was elected President.48
The Court appears to have found it
intolerable to permit the election
controversy to be resolved by these who
were elected to resolve it and who would
have to risk the displeasure of voters if
they resolved it wrong, despite the fact
that it was overwhelmingly likely that the
result would be to place Governor Bush in
the White House. (This latter point is
overlooked by those who focus narrowly
on the apparently partisan – five
Republicans outvote four Democrats –
nature of the decision.) The danger or
unseemliness or undesirability of a
resolution by persons accountable to the
people was so pressing in their minds that

48

See POSNER, BREAKING THE
DEADLOCK 184-85 (constitutional issues
arising from the joint session’s decisions on
counting the electoral votes probably would
have been political questions unreviewable by
the courts).

16

CARRINGTON & POWELL

resolution by the Court appeared
preferable even though it produced the
bizarre result that the Court itself
determined which candidate would be
vested with the power to appoint its
members.
There is nothing new in the
observation that members of the Court,
other members of the judiciary, and
prominent members of the profession
often display in their decisions an
alienated disdain for the processes of
American democratic politics.49 What is
significant about Justice Scalia’s behavior
in Bush v. Gore is that it shows how deep
this resistance to decision by political
means has become. Even an elaborate,
publicly
professed
“interpretive
philosophy” takes a back seat, it seems, to
the impulse to displace the messiness of
politics with the ostensible reasonability
and order of judicial decision-making
when it comes to deciding a case of
elevated personal interest to the Justices.
As in many other situations where
(in our judgment, at any rate) the Supreme
Court has usurped power properly lodged
in the political branches or in the states, it
appears that the Court got away with Bush
v. Gore.50
There is, at present, no
substantial body of opinion, either among
49

The point has been made by each
of us, among others. See CARRINGTON,
STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY (1999); POWELL,
THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993).
50

See Herbert M. Kritzer, The
Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions
and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85
JUDICATURE 33, 37 (2001) (although
“Republicans became more supportive and
Democrats ... less,” “the net effect on the
public’s evaluation [of the Court] is
essentially nil”).

the public generally or in the legal
profession or the academy (where most
constitutional law scholars support an
expansive role for the Court) that objects
in a systematic fashion to the Court’s
enthusiasm for self-aggrandizing countermajoritarianism, and for understandable
reasons. While individual decisions of
the Court anger significant numbers of
people with some frequency, as an overall
matter the Court’s decisions keep it
reasonably close to the political center of
gravity of an economically privileged
ruling class. The legal profession in
America is very large and very powerful
and its members seem to perceive that
their status and power is somehow linked
to that of the Justices. The long-standing
and
deep-seated
reverence
most
Americans feel for the Republic’s basic
system of government will probably
therefore continue to shelter the Court
from the consequences one might
otherwise expect when a governmental
institution in a democracy becomes selfcentered.
For most Americans, the
concerns that we raise about decisional
integrity and respect for representative
government seem too abstract, too
bloodless to raise any sustained passion.
Indeed, there appears to us to be a
false sense that it is uncivil and
unprofessional as well as unpatriotic to
call attention to self-aggrandizement by
the Justices. Perhaps because they do
their work in a building designed to
resemble a pagan temple, many who must
know better seem reluctant to call
attention to the Court’s self-dealing. We
sense among lawyers a special
unwillingness to recognize the reality of
what the Court did.
Perhaps we are less than civil in
calling attention to that reality. However,
the costs to American society of
permitting the Court to behave as it did in
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Bush v. Gore seem real to us. There are
occasions when incivility is a public duty.
The Court’s membership is drawn
from a narrow segment of American
society, and its perception of public
policy bears the stamp of that narrow
class’s
interests
and
concerns.51
Moreover, widespread acceptance of
judicial politics “erod[es] the habits and
temperament of representative democracy.”52 The honor, gratification, and
51

To document this assertion is a
task for another day, but consider as an
example the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.
Roughly speaking, what the Court has done is
create a regime in which (a) anyone with
access to upper middle-class finances can
obtain an abortion, although (b) in any
individual state a significant number of
obstacles
to
doing
so
(which
disproportionately affect poorer women) can
be imposed, and (c) government need not fund
abortions so that the well to do need not
subsidize the poor on this matter. As many
other commentators have observed, this
constellation of outcomes, however the
Justices consciously arrived at it, perfectly
mirrors the selfish interests of well to do
Americans.
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responsibility of those holding elective
office are diminished. And so, also, are
the honor, gratification, and responsibility
associated with the performance of one’s
duty as a citizen to vote on important
matters. Even before Bush v. Gore, the
Court had made itself the central issue in
six consecutive presidential elections,
limiting the ability of those seeking
popular support from gaining public
attention on public issues worthy of
discussion. The decision in that case thus
accelerates the degradation of all public
offices outside the life-tenured federal
judiciary and enhances the sense of
citizens that they are not the masters of
the Republic.
We do not suggest that elected
representatives of the people make wise
decisions. Often they do not. The great
advantage of having disputes resolved by
them and not by the Court is that the
people share in the responsibility for
decisions made by those they choose and
they can throw the rascals out when they
do the wrong thing. Even if those elites
serving with life tenure have better
judgment than the people or their
representatives, -- and we do not concede
that they do -- they cannot provide either
of those very great advantages that are the
source of the stabilizing effect of
democratic government.
We note that a similar
degradation of democratic traditions is
occurring in other countries in which high
courts are seeking to emulate the Supreme
Court of the United States.53
The

52

F. L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF,
THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT
PARTY 149 (2000).
53

See also HAIG PATAPAN, JUDGING
DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF THE
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA (Cambridge UK
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observations of F.L. Morton and Rainer
Knopff about the expanding political role
of the Canadian courts are equally
applicable to this country:
The growth of courtroom rights
talk undermines perhaps the
fundamental prerequisite of decent
liberal democratic politics: the
willingness to engage those with
whom one disagrees in the ongoing
attempt to combine diverse
interests into temporarily viable
governing minorities.
Liberal
democracy works only when
majorities rather than minorities
rule, and when it is obvious to all
that
ruling
majorities
are
themselves coalitions of minorities
in a pluralistic society. Partisan
opponents,
in
short,
must
nevertheless be seen as fellow
citizens who might be future allies.
Representative institutions facilitate
this
fundamental
democratic
disposition;
judicial
power
undermines it.54
Returning constitutional law and
the Court to their proper, limited roles in
American democracy would not be easy.
But it cannot be done at all if the Court is
free to interfere with the Republic’s
fundamental democratic processes with
the acceptance and approval of the legal

2000); KATE MALLESON, THE NEW
JUDICIARY: THE EFFECTS OF EXPANSION AND
ACTIVISM (Ashgate 1999); U. C. JAIN &
JEEVAN NAIR, JUDICIARY IN INDIA 140-259
(Jaipur 2000). Judging from these works, it
appears that the Brennan vision of the antidemocratic role of the judiciary is infectious
among English-speaking judges.
54

129.

MORTON & KNOPFF, note 51, at

profession and the academy, and if
individual Justices are not held
accountable in public discussion when
they disregard their own expressed
principles out of a disdain for democratic
politics and an ambition to protect and
enhance their own individual powers.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the political
legitimacy of courts exercising judicial
review is settled and we do not mean to
suggest that this feature of our system
should or could be abolished, although we
do believe that current practice goes
beyond what can be justified. American
courts ought exercise their powers of
judicial review only in the democratic
tradition in which majoritarian political
decision-making is the norm. Even when
they displace such decisions, those with
life tenure have no commission to do so
other than on the basis of constitutional
norms that themselves were the product of
majoritarian political processes.
“It is quite impossible for the
courts, creatures and agents of the people
of the United States,” Justice Scalia
affirmed, “to impose upon those people of
the United States norms that those people
themselves (through their democratic
institutions) have not accepted.”55
Unfortunately, such impositions are by no
means impossible, only antidemocratic
and wrong. And especially wrong, it
seems to us, when the effect is selfaggrandizing enhancement of the personal
power and status of the Justices
themselves.
If there be readers who are able
and willing to explain why the decision in
55

Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. at 1122.
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Bush v. Gore was not manifest selfaggrandizement, or who are able and
willing to explain to us how that decision
can be reconciled with a republican form
of government, we would be grateful for
their illumination.
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